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ECO'S ECHOES: 
SEMIOTIC THEORY AND 
DETECTIVE PRACTICE IN 
THE NAME OF THE ROSE 
DAVID H. RICHTER 
Queens College, City University of New York 
Structure I. Eco and the Semiotics of Detection 
omnis mundi creatura 
quasi liber et pictura 
nobis est in speculum 
Alain de Lille (1130-1202): "Anticlaudianus"' 
The Name of the Rose can be said, in effect, to trace the stages in 
the long line between Alain de Lille, the twelfth-century 
antischolastic, and modern structuralists like Umberto Eco himself. 
Separated by eight centuries, Alain and Eco would agree that the 
world is like a vast text, "quasi liber et pictura," and that our task on 
earth is learning the rules for reading it. 
The Name of the Rose has been treated as an unusually clever 
pastiche of the Sherlock Holmes novels. This is a misreading, but one 
that Eco has courted. He has, after all, named his protagonist William 
of Baskerville, made him a native of Ireland (like Doyle's ancestors), 
given him the height, the sharpness of eye and beakiness of nose 
associated with the sleuth of Baker Street. The narrator's name, 
Adso, is the middle four phonemes of "Watson" (as close as one 
could come in a Latinized name), and though a cloistered monk, Adso 
shares Watson's unascetic gusto for the pleasures of the table and his 
predilection for romance, along with a talent for muddling up the 
clues. 
The structure of Eco's novel, however, owes very little to Doyle, 
whose longer detective fictions usually tended to split into two 
novelettes: one a tale of crime and detection, the other a sensational 
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melodrama about Mormons or East Indian convicts or labor 
racketeering in the industrial Midwest. (Only The Hound of the 
Baskervilles, to which William's name obviously alludes, has the 
unity of plot and tone Eco has achieved here). In its plotting The 
Name of the Rose seems to owe less to Doyle than to Dorothy Sayers, 
John Dickson Carr and Ellery Queen. Despite the medieval setting, 
Eco has collected the complete paraphernalia of a classic mystery of 
the 1930s: maps, cryptograms, unbreakable alibis, a locked room, a 
labyrinthine library, clues in a variety of foreign languages, all 
surrounding a series of grisly murders, carefully spaced one per day, 
with an elaborate textual patterning to them. It was apparently Eco's 
intention to write the mystery to end all mysteries. 
But there is another sense in which The Name of the Rose is a 
mystery to end all mysteries: it is also a critique and a parody of the 
form. This is true in obvious ways-merely setting a murder mystery 
in the late middle ages suggests either more or less than entirely 
serious intentions. Part of the book's pleasure comes from watching 
the conventions of the form crop up, regular as fate, in the most 
unexpected settings. As a result, the reader seems to be reading two 
novels at once: a classic detective story, and a detective story in 
quotation marks-the latter a post-modern fiction which calls atten- 
tion to its very fictionality. 
Perhaps Eco is merely spoofing the mystery form. But the parody 
has its serious side where it connects with Eco's professional interest 
in detection as a semiotic activity. It is only in a superficial sense that 
The Name of the Rose presents a Holmes-figure in characteristic ac- 
tion: for William of Baskerville is far more self-conscious and self- 
critical than Doyle's self-aggrandizing detective who, in A Study in 
Scarlet (his debut novel), writes a magazine article boasting of his 
infallibility.' As a philosopher, Eco is more aware than Doyle was of 
the logical status of detective ingenuity. 
Throughout the Holmes stories, the detective's abilities are 
explained as "the science of deduction." One locus classicus 
explaining the Holmesian method occurs in The Sign of Four: 
"But you spoke just now of observation and deduction. 
Surely the one to some extent implies the other." 
"Why, hardly," [Holmes] answered. . . . "For example, 
observation shows me that you have been to the Wigmore Street 2




Post-Office this morning, but deduction lets me know that when 
there you dispatched a telegram." 
"Right!" said I. "Right on both points! But I confess that I 
don't see how you arrived at it . . ." 
"It is simplicity itself," he remarked, chuckling at my 
surprise -"so absurdly simple that an explanation is 
superfluous; and yet it may serve to define the limits of observa- 
tion and of deduction. Observation tells me that you have a little 
reddish mould adhering to your instep. Just opposite the 
Wigmore Street Office they have taken up the pavement and 
thrown up some earth, which lies in such a way that it is difficult 
to avoid treading in it in entering. The earth is of this peculiar 
reddish tint which is found, as far as I know, nowhere else in the 
neighbourhood. So much is observation. The rest is deduc- 
tion." 
"How, then, did you deduce the telegram?" 
"Why, of course I knew that you had not written a letter, 
since I sat opposite to you all morning. I see also in your open 
desk there that you have a sheet of stamps and a thick bundle of 
postcards. What could you go into the post-office for, then, but to 
send a wire? Eliminate all other factors, and the one which 
remains must be the truth." (pp. 138-39) 
Holmes-and Doyle-probably thought that this was a perfect 
demonstration of deductive logic, but when one examines it a bit, it is 
rather less than impeccable. The syllogism upon which Holmes's 
inference relies would run, according to his explanation, as follows: 
Men who enter the Post Office will invariably get red 
mould on their boots. 
Watson has red mould on his boots. 
Therefore Watson has entered the Post Office. 
But this syllogism is invalid: the middle term is undistributed. A 
syllogism in barbara could be constructed if the major term were 
given as "All those and only those who enter the post office have red 
mould on their boots." But this is not what Holmes actually asserts, 
and detectives in general do not make their assertions in such a form. 
One might step in red earth walking past the post-office; one might 3
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step into it and clean one's boots afterwards. Similarly with Holmes's 
"deduction" of the telegram: if there were three and only three reasons 
for entering a post office (sending a letter, buying postage, dispatching 
a telegram), then eliminating the first two possibilities would demon- 
strate the third. But is it possible to catalog and eliminate all the 
possible reasons for entering a post office? The point is not that 
Holmes is a charlatan, or that Doyle was, but that logical deduction, 
of the sort whose regulations are presented in Aristotle's Posterior 
Analytics, has very little to do with what Holmes is doing. It is 
noteworthy that the philosopher who best described the art Holmes 
practiced-the art upon which scientists, doctors, and real detectives 
all depend-was a contemporary of Doyle's, the American Charles 
Sanders Peirce.' To the previously established logical methods of 
deduction and induction, Peirce added a third, which he gave the 
perhaps unfortunate name of "abduction." Whereas deduction 
proceeds from a general rule (or a definition) to a particular case, and 
whereas induction proceeds from a series of facts to a general rule, 
"abduction" is "the provisional entertainment of an explanatory 
inference, for the sake of further testing."4 In abduction-a mode of 
reasoning we all probably use far more often than strict syllogistic 
deduction-both the general rule and the particular conclusion are 
held only tentatively; they are conjectures to be confirmed or refuted, 
not certain truths. 
One does not need to read Eco's philosophical essay on abduc- 
tion to understand its relevance to detective fiction. Much of it is 
explicitly presented in The Name of the Rose: 
"Adso," William said, "solving a mystery is not the same as 
deducing from first principles. Nor does it amount simply to 
collecting a number of particular data from which to infer a 
general law. It means, rather, facing one or two or three particular 
data apparently with nothing in common, and trying to imagine 
whether they could represent so many instances of a general law 
you don't yet know, and which perhaps has never been 
pronounced. . . . Take the case of animals with horns. Why do 
they have horns? Suddenly you realize that all animals with 
horns are without [incisors] in the upper jaw. This would be a fine 
discovery, if you did not also realize that, alas, there are animals 
without [incisors] in the upper jaw who, however, do not have 
horns: the camel, to name one. And finally you realize that all 4




animals without [incisors] in the upper jaw have four stomachs. 
Well, then, you can suppose that one who cannot chew well must 
need four stomachs to digest food better. But what about the 
horns? You then try to imagine a material cause for horns-say, 
the lack of teeth provides the animal with an excess of osseous 
matter that must emerge somewhere else. But is that sufficient 
explanation? No, because the camel has no upper teeth . . . but 
does not have horns. And you must also imagine a final cause. 
The osseous matter emerges in horns only in animals without 
other means of defense. But the camel has a very tough hide and 
doesn't need horns. . . . The search for explicative laws in natural 
facts proceeds in a tortuous fashion. In the face of some 
inexplicable facts you must try to imagine many general laws, 
whose connection with the facts escapes you. Then suddenly, in 
the unexpected connection of a result, a specific situation, and 
one of those laws, you perceive a line of reasoning that seems 
more convincing than the others. You try applying it . . . to use it 
for making predictions, and you discover that your intuition was 
right. But until you reach the end you will never know which 
predicates to introduce into your reasoning and which to 
omit. . ."5 
William's theory here is one of the major "problematic 
anachronisms" that I shall discuss in the next section of this essay. As 
a theory, it owes a great deal to Peirce, and nearly as much to Sir Karl 
Popper's explanation of the scientific method as a series of conjec- 
tures and refutations in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1952). But 
the example William gives is straight out of Aristotle's On the Parts of 
Animals, a text Eco also analyzes at length in "Horns, Hooves, 
Insteps," showing that 2300 years ago "the master of those that 
know" intuitively understood the essential tool of scientific method 
which Eco calls "creative abduction" ("Horns," p. 215). 
In The Sign of Four Holmes is permitted suavely to assure 
Watson, "I never guess. It is a shocking habit-destructive to the 
logical faculty" (p. 138). But in The Name of the Rose Eco's detec- 
tive, the superficially Holmesian William of Baskerville, is well aware 
that in the exercise of his logical faculty he needs to guess constantly, 
and that the world-made up as it is of "everything that is the case" - 
will confirm or deny his hypotheses, make him seem a genius or a fool. 5
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It is significant that the opening demonstration of William's 
detective abilities-his description and location of the abbot's horse 
Brunellus (pp. 23-25)-though a convention of the detective novel 
since Doyle, does not directly allude to the Sherlock Holmes canon. 
Instead of using a displaced version of one of Holmes's feats, Eco 
began The Name of the Rose with a revision of part of chapter 3 of 
Zadig. There the Chaldean hero of Voltaire's conte philosophique 
dazzles the servants of the King of Babylon by telling them that the 
horse they are looking for, and which Zadig himself has never laid 
eyes on, "is the fleetest horse in the King's stable. . . . He is five feet 
high, with very small hoofs, and a tall three and a half feet in length; the 
studs on his bit are gold of twenty-three carats, and his shoes are silver 
of eleven pennyweights.''' 
My first notion was that, in this detective-story-to-end-all-detec- 
tive-stories, Eco thought it clever to begin with a proto-detective fic- 
tion written a century before Poe's pioneering tales. But after looking 
at "Horns, Hooves, Insteps," it becomes clear that Eco had 
something else in mind as well-what he calls "meta-abduction," the 
problem of testing for correspondence the world of one's mental 
constructs against the world outside one's head. The reason Zadig is 
only one of the forerunners of the detective story and not its first 
exemplar is that Zadig himself refuses to take that step. When the 
huntsmen ask where the horse is, Zadig refuses to guess as Holmes 
would do, but instead replies "I have not seen him . . . and never heard 
talk of him before" (p. 11). And, Zadig is first condemned for stealing 
the horse and then, when the horse is found, for lying to the huntsmen 
about not having seen the beast whose characteristics he had actually 
abduced. Eco's meditation on Zadig is that, while the philosopher is 
willing to speak about his abductions as mental constructs of his own, 
he resists being trapped into asserting an identity between the possible 
horse of his inferences and the actual horse the huntsmen are seeking: 
"Unable to accept his fate as a Sherlock Holmes, Zadig was 
frightened by meta-abduction" ("Horns," p. 215). 
Holmes, of course, is never frightened. Though as Eco points 
out, he often guesses with far less reason for certainty than Zadig had, 
he never guesses wrong. This is because "he has the privilege of living 
in a world built by Conan Doyle to fit his egocentric need, so he 
does not lack immediate proofs of his perspicacity" ("Horns," 
p. 218). 6




There is always faithful Watson, ever ready to admit to having acted 
or thought as Holmes guesses; nor is the outside world of crime ever so 
unkind as to falsify Holmes's abductions. Eco goes on to suggest that, 
"Whereas in criminal stories an omnipotent God verifies the 
hypotheses forever, in 'real' scientific inquiries (as well as in real 
criminal, medical, or philological deduction) meta-abductions are a 
frightening matter. Zadig is not a detection story but a philosophical 
tale because its deep subject is exactly the vertigo of meta-abduc- 
tion" ("Horns," p. 219). 
As we shall see more clearly in the last section of this essay, The 
Name of the Rose stands midway between the detective story and the 
philosophic tale. More like a Sherlock Holmes than a Zadig, William 
of Baskerville defies the "vertigo" and volunteers his guess about 
what Brunellus looks like and where he has gone. And as though he 
were in a literary world protected by Doyle, the guess is right on 
target. But unlike the detectives who attribute their infallibility to logic 
rather than authorial kindness, William knows that his was merely a 
lucky guess: 
In the case of the horse Brunellus, when I saw the clues I guessed 
many complementary and contradictory hypotheses. . . . I didn't 
know which hypothesis was right until I saw the cellarer and the 
servants anxiously searching. Then I understood that the 
Brunellus hypothesis was the only right one, and I tried to prove it 
true, addressing the monks as I did. I won, but I might also have 
lost. The others believed me wise because I won, but they didn't 
know the many instances in which I have been foolish because I 
lost, and they didn't know that a few seconds before winning I 
wasn't sure I wouldn't lose. (Name, p. 305) 
While the Holmesian whodunit proceeds on the Cartesian 
assumption that there is an order to the universe that can be mirrored 
in the constructs of an orderly mind, Eco's mystery takes a more 
modern, post-Kantian tack. William never doubts that mental 
constructs may possess clarity and order: but there is always a leap of 
faith to the decision that the outside world does. And Eco, as we shall 
see, is less kind to William than Doyle is to Sherlock Holmes. In this 
sense The Name of the Rose is based upon a semiotic theory that is 
essentially subversive of the mystery genre. And in setting such a 7
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semiotic quest within the middle ages, Eco's novel is structurally 
underpinned by a global anachronism, within which local instances of 
intellectual time-warp are set as textural motifs. 
Texture I. Problematic Anachronisms 
In The Name ofthe Rose we are not allowed unselfconsciously to 
lose ourselves in a historical novel. We are again and again made 
aware by the work's inherent contradictions-or apparent 
anachronisms-that we are reading one. In a sense, there was no way 
Eco could have preserved "suspension of disbelief." The reader is 
bound to be brought up short from time to time by the inescapable 
anachronism of the novel-a whodunit set in the middle ages. The 
strategy taken up by many contemporary historical novelists (e.g., 
Mary Renault or Robert Graves), of attempting as far as possible to 
convey the life of the narrative past in language and narrative 
technique roughly appropriate to that period, is foreclosed for Eco. To 
be a detective at all, his protagonist, William of Baskerville, must be 
essentially a modern man, but he must also be placed within a 
medieval setting that is as authentic as possible. There is an inherent 
self-contradiction in this, but instead of trying to deceive the reader 
about this, Eco chose a playful way of writing historical fiction that 
would keep the reader off balance; it would fall somewhere between 
pastiche and serious narrative. 
One way of playing with the reader is the phony anachronism. 
The game to which Eco invites us involves matching wits with the 
author, and so is structurally similar to the game in the detective story 
proper except that it can be played again and again. The pattern runs 
in this way: the author allows the "thoroughly modern" William of 
Baskerville to use a phrase that recalls a quotation from a later date, or 
to mention some fact or some process we associate with a more 
modern period. Then the reader recalls-or looks up-the actual 
historical situation, and the apparent anachronism is eliminated. 
Take, for example, William's statement: "We are dwarfs . . . but 
dwarfs who stand on the shoulder of those giants, and small though we 
are, we sometimes manage to see farther on the horizon than 8




they" (p. 86). This is an all-too-familiar quotation. The classic 
formulation is: "dwarves that stand on the shoulders of giants can see 
farther than the giants themselves," usually ascribed to Isaac Newton 
in the late seventeenth century. Eco is probably familiar, though, with 
the work of the sociologist of knowledge Robert K. Merton, who wrote 
a very entertaining little book called On the Shoulders of Giants. It 
traces the quotation back considerably before 1327-to the twelfth- 
century philosopher Bernard of Chartres-and Eco even includes the 
detail that his William of Baskerville had studied at Chartres. 
A more convoluted instance involves Adso's heartfelt remark on 
Jacques of Cahors, later Pope John XXII: "and heaven grant that no 
pontiff take again a name so distasteful to the righteous" (p. 12). The 
first level of the joke is fairly obvious: it is well-known that Angelo 
Giuseppe Roncalli, on ascending the throne of St. Peter, took the title 
of John XXIII as a way of disinfecting a name that had remained 
unused since the middle ages. The second level of the joke is rather 
more obscure: the bad smell in the name of John had been left at least 
as much by a previous John XXIII (Baldassare Cossa, 1410-15) as 
by the John XXII who appears in The Name of the Rose. The 
fifteenth-century pope (he was one of two anti-popes-the other was 
Benedict XIII-who had been elected by a faction during the official 
pontificate of Gregory XII) was accused of so many crimes, including 
heresy, simony, piracy, sodomy, rape, incest and the assassination of 
his predecessor, that he was deposed by the Council of Constance as 
scandalk or ecclesiae. 
Not all the anachronisms turn into jokes on the half-learned 
reader. Some of them remain anachronisms. Most of these are 
intertextual jokes, like the hints (p. 16) that William gets high chewing 
the leaves of some mysterious forest herbs (whose effects-lethargy 
and visions-sound suspiciously like those of cannabis). Here, of 
course, the point is an allusion to Sherlock Holmes's dalliance, at 
times of intellectual vacuity, with the cocaine-bottle. Substituting 
cannabis for coca is at least mildly anachronistic, since around 1327 
Indian Hemp was used as a drug only in the Orient and was 
apparently unknown in the West till the 1580s. We could make the 
favorable assumption that William is familiar with Eastern sources 
now forgotten, but cocaine itself would have been utterly impossible, 
as the coca plant is native to the Americas and would be unavailable in 
Europe for nearly two hundred years. 9
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Some of the anachronistic jokes, though, are not intertextual in 
any very specific sense: they pertain rather to the general tradition of 
learned wit to which this novel belongs. At one point William recites a 
few gnomic lines from a text called Hisperica . . . famina, apparently 
a medieval poem about the Irish Potato Famine of the 1840s (p. 311). 
At still another point William makes what we cannot fail to interpret 
as a mocking allusion to Freud ("We have so many truths in our 
possession that if the day came when someone insisted on deriving a 
truth even from our dreams, then the day of the Antichrist would truly 
be at hand" (p. 438). And on what is nearly the novel's last page 
(p. 492), William quotes for Adso "a mystic from your land" 
(Germany), who wrote "somewhere, I forget where" about 
philosophical constructs: " 'Er muoz gel ichsame die leiter abwerfen, 
so er an it ufgestigen' " (p. 438). It means "One must throw down the 
ladder as soon as he has climbed up it," and it was written-though 
not in Middle High German, of course-by Ludwig Wittgenstein in 
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921).' 
The novel is filled with this sort of amusement-a sort of PhD- 
level Trivial Pursuit. Out of hundreds possible let me give one last 
example, which is not a joke but rather an homage to the greatest 
master of the learned wit tradition, Francois Rabelais. The 
"maguffin" of The Name of the Rose, the manuscript containing 
Aristotle's lost treatise on comedy, is bound together with several 
other manuscripts in various languages; one of these is "Expositio 
Magistri Alcofribae de coena beati Cypriani Cartaginensis Episcopi" 
(p. 439)-a commentary on the porno-satiric Coena Cypriani by one 
"Master Alcofribas." "Alcofribas Nasier," of course, was the 
anagrammatical pseudonym under which Rabelais began in 1532 to 
publish his porno-satirical histories of Gargantua and Pantagruel. 
There are a number of connections here: like William of Baskerville, 
Rabelais was a Franciscan friar who transferred for political reasons 
to the Benedictines. Adso and William's pleasure in lists-lists that 
go on long after you expected them to be exhausted-comes directly 
from Rabelais. But the central issue, I suspect, is the "carnivaliza- 
tion" (as Mikhail Bakhtin puts it) of history and scholarship Rabelais 
brings to fiction. This carnivalization is precisely what Eco is 
attempting in The Name of the Rose: not a parody of the detective 
story, precisely, nor a pastiche, but a witty and learned game which 
not only solicits but demands the participation of the reader, and deals 
out rewards in proportion to his own learning and wit. 10




Texture II. Time in The Name of the Rose: The Black Death 
In The Role of the Reader, Eco has analyzed the way Time is 
structured in series detective stories, like those involving Sherlock 
Holmes or Nero Wolfe: he calls this "the iterative scheme. "8 In each 
novel or story, the "event takes up again from a sort of virtual 
beginning, ignoring where the preceding event left off" (Role, p. 119). 
A series, like the Nero Wolfe stories of Rex Stout, contains a vast 
number of topoi, which are repeated again and again. On the one hand 
there are "infinite variations of the theme" in that each new crime 
"has new psychological and economic motivations" (Role, p. 119); 
on the other hand, the memorable moments are the ones that recur 
from book to book (e.g., Wolfe getting up to tend his orchids when the 
case is at an obvious crisis point). The point is that as a series, it 
ignores the way time is consumed by the events of the story: for over 
forty years-from the early 1930s when the series began to the late 
1970s when it ended-Wolfe always seems to be a man in his forties, 
Archie Goodwin in his late twenties. Rare cases may fall into an 
ordered series, and occasionally a novel will refer to one of its 
predecessors or to a topical event, but generally each novel 
constitutes a new beginning that is connected only vaguely to 
historical time or to the continuous pasts of the series characters. 
Historical detective stories like The Name of the Rose must be 
set at some definite time (i.e., they cannot be set in a vague narrative 
present like the Nero Wolfe series, but there is no reason that Eco's 
"iterative scheme" may not apply to them. Indeed, the "Sergeant 
Cribb" series of Peter Lovesey is a sequence of Victorian romans 
policiers with eminently predictable topoi. Most historical 
whodunits, even when they happen to be singletons (like John 
Dickson Can's The Demoniacs), fail to consume the lives of the 
narrator and/or the detective; unlike most novels, they might be 
continued indefinitely, in that nothing unalterable occurs to charac- 
ters other than the disposable victims and villains. 
In The Name of the Rose, however, Eco reverses this narrative 
convention of the detective story. Though the story takes up only a 
week or so in the lives of William and Adso, the novel is set within a 
restrictive time-frame that "consumes" the characters and prevents 
any sense of possible continuation. Most important for this aspect of 11
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the story is the framed beginning and ending of the story, in which 
Adso the narrator, old and perhaps dying toward the end of the 
fourteenth century, places in context the events of the novel, which are 
set within his youth in the year 1327. The effect is not solely a matter 
of age and youth: between Adso the writer and Adso the character 
there looms the great event of the fourteenth century, the Black Death 
of 1348-50. Before the Black Death were the high middle ages, the 
renaissance of learning of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; after it 
came a century of chaos as Europe recovered from the death of over 
one third of its population. William, Adso tells us, perished during the 
plague-which perhaps we are to see as a less than tragically prema- 
ture end for a man who is well into his fifties in 1327. The point, 
though, is that Adso, who survived, tells us of a society which largely 
did not: he tells us of "the disaster of an aging world" (p. 15). 
In terms of the "distant mirror" aspect of The Name ofthe Rose, 
the intertextual play between the fourteenth and twentieth centuries, 
the Black Death is an equivalent of atomic holocaust-a close 
equivalent, if one adds the proviso that the latter is less likely to leave 
monastic chroniclers like Adso to record it. What is probably most 
important about it, for Eco's purposes, is that in Adso's retrospective 
narrative (and the reader's historical perspective) the echo of the 
Black Death invests the action with the sense of impending chaos, of 
an apparently ordered and balanced intellectual and social system 
whose doom is already pronounced. 
Texture III. The "Distant Mirror" Theme 
Barbara Tuchman's popular history of the fourteenth century 
was entitled A Distant Mirror and she was by no means the first 
historian to see "phenomenal parallels" between that age and our 
own. When this century was only two decades old, James Westfall 
Thompson was ready to compare the aftermath of World War I with 
that of the Black Death. Thompson saw both the fourteenth and the 
twentieth centuries as exceptionally disordered: in both he found 
running rampant "economic chaos, social unrest, high prices, 12




profiteering, depraved morals, lack of production, industrial 
indolence, frenetic gaiety, wild expenditure, luxury, debauchery, 
social and religious hysteria, greed, avarice, maladministration, 
decay of manners." 9 The advent over the past forty years of weaponry 
capable of depopulating the world faster and more dependably than 
the bubonic plague has only deepened the sense that we have 
something to learn from that unhappy period. 
Just as the tone of The Name of the Rose owes a good deal to the 
overhanging shadow of the Black Death, Eco's secondary purpose in 
setting his detective entertainment in the early fourteenth century may 
have had more to do with the pestilential politics of Emperor and Pope 
than with the apocalypse of rats and lice that came later. The 
suggestive analogy, I think, for a liberal European socialist like Eco, is 
the cold war between Louis the Bavarian and John XXII on the one 
hand, and that today on the other between capitalism and 
communism, America and the Soviet Union, NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact. In both cases, I think Eco deplores the insistent division of the 
political and moral powers of the known world, a division that 
implicitly brooks neither independence nor neutrality, which claims 
that all who are not for me are against me. I would argue that Eco has 
drawn such an analogy, and has developed it at a length that- 
detracting formally from The Name of the Rose as it does-indicates 
the strength of his personal commitment to it." 
The general structure of the political allegory, which is not 
explored with absolute consistency, would equate the party of Holy 
Roman Emperor Louis of Bavaria with the massive might of the 
USSR, with the ideology of socialism, perhaps with the alliance of 
Warsaw Pact and socialist movements in Europe and the Third 
World; conversely, the party of Pope John XXII might be identified 
with the USA, with the ideology of capitalism, with the NATO 
alliance. This alignment would put the Franciscans-who were in 
doctrinal opposition to the Pope, though ostensibly his own order-in 
the approximate position of the European socialist movements. 
Perhaps I have this backwards. Since the Emperor had the habit of 
using, then abandoning his allies and since the Pope was the more 
obviously ruthless of the two men, it may be that we are to link Louis 
with the Western and John with the Eastern bloc. In fact the orienta- 
tion of the allegory makes very little difference. What is important for 
Eco is the absolute nature of the confrontation, the way the political 13
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battle raged over Europe for decades with final victory ever elusive, 
and the fact that the outcome of the battle, for both sides, was the 
destruction of the authority of the institutions they represented. 
For an Italian socialist like Eco, in fact, the central problems of 
the international scene have to do less with the USA and the USSR, 
with their half billion inhabitants, than with the impact of their struggle 
on the three billion people elsewhere in nations that might prefer to be 
unaligned but who are inexorably forced to take sides, if only to give 
them standing to help mediate the conflict. While there are no certain 
limits to the application of Eco's political allegory in The Name ofthe 
Rose, I think there are at least three major issues that haunt him: (1) 
the nominally "socialist" revolutionary movements in the Third 
World, (2) the attraction of intellectuals to terrorism, and (3) the 
international penetration of other nations by clandestine political 
organizations like CIA and KGB. Let me briefly indicate the connec- 
tions between Eco's fiction and these three problems. 
1. The fourteenth century was a fertile period for heresies of 
various sorts: Fraticelli, Catharists, Waldensians, Arnoldists, 
Patarines, and countless other groups sprang up and were ruthlessly 
extirpated by the Papacy. Around pp. 196-207, William holds a 
platonic dialogue with Adso on what he calls "the great river of 
heresy." William rejects the idea that most heretics are convinced 
adherents of particular mistaken doctrines. In fact, he points out, most 
heretics are simple folk who might join the Catharists in one village 
and the Waldensians in another-though the two heresies are 
doctrinally quite distinct. In the Church's view a heretical doctrine is 
first proclaimed by a renegade cleric and then taken up by the simple. 
In William's view it is the condition of being "simple" rather than the 
doctrine that causes heresy, for the simple-those landless peasants 
without a stake in the State, who were equally excluded from the 
intellectual and social protection of the Church-join heretical 
movements not because they believe but because the movements give 
them hope: the hope at least of violently overthrowing the order that 
excludes them. 
The parallel is obvious between William's "simple" heretics and 
the peasantry today who join, and willingly fight and die for socialist 
or communist movements in the Third World. Their doctrinal 
commitment to Marxism is scant at best: they believe in whatever 
opposes the native or colonial powers that be, whatever gives them 
hope to overturn the order that keeps them hungry. Eco seems to be 14




suggesting that the West, and the USA in particular, is paranoid about 
such "communist" movements; it misunderstands them as an overt 
threat to join the Soviet enemy, when the cause is not an affection for 
the ideas of Marx but the hunger of the people-a hunger for inclu- 
sion within the international polity no less than for bread. 
2. One rather memorable character Eco took from the pages of 
history and transferred to The Name of the Rose is Fra Ubertino of 
Casale, author of the Arbor Vitae Crucifixae. Ubertino was one of the 
Spirituales, a rather mystical religious movement deriving from the 
prophecies of the twelfth-century apocalyptic thinker Joachim da 
Floris. Ubertino's personal history and that of his movement appear 
in The Name of the Rose at pp. 41-64; for most of the rest of the novel, 
Ubertino is relatively undeveloped as a character, neither a suspect 
nor a victim. The point of his introduction, in a way, can be fully 
understood only after the passages on heresy, for Ubertino is an 
intellectual whose preaching led the "simple" to join heretical 
movements (like the Dolcinians and the Fraticelli), movements that 
the Papacy crushed with fire and the sword. But Ubertino somehow 
managed to keep himself clear of the taint of heresy, speaks with 
horror of the Fraticelli, and evidently believes that there is some 
quintessential difference between the beliefs of Fra Dolcino, who 
suffered at the stake, and his own-but what that difference is the 
reader will be at a loss to determine. 
I can make sense of this episode as a displaced commentary on a 
group of European leftists who glorify revolution but who have little 
stomach for the violence of terrorists that would put their programs 
into practice. These "limousine liberals," like Ubertino, have no 
intention of losing their privileged places in the societies they attack, 
much less of suffering for their beliefs. Eco may have in mind the 
crowds that idolized Herbert Marcuse or Frantz F anon in the sixties; 
perhaps Ubertino is a satire on the grand-daddy of them all: Jean-Paul 
Sartre. In any case, Eco quietly exposes their hypocritical habit of 
theoretically advocating violence while remaining noncommittal 
about savage terrorism of the Black September type. 
3. Finally there is another character out of history: the Papal 
Inquisitor Bernard Gui (1261-1331), author of the Practica Inquisi- 
tionis. In a sense, Bernard assumes a place within The Name of the 
Rose that the traditional structure of the detective story assigns to the 
dumb cop, the unimaginative official policeman who flails about, 
baffled by his inability to solve the crime. But Bernard is more than a 15
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structural locus and a foil for William. It is hard to forget that, unlike 
the usual behavior of cops in whodunits, he has three innocent people 
executed for crimes they have not committed. One point Eco makes 
about Bernard's methods is that, seeking out heresy, he invariably 
finds it, as the accused's words and deeds will ineluctably be twisted 
against him. The other point is that the Inquisition, in trying to 
extirpate heresy by the most arbitrary and limitless methods, ends by 
causing more than it cures. The analogue could be simply to the 
modern version of the Inquisition, the secret police, which, under 
various names in both Eastern and Western bloc nations, provokes 
the opposition it aims to still. But given the international slant to Eco's 
analogues, Gui and the Inquisition may also stand for the interna- 
tional organizations (like the CIA) specializing in covert activities 
whose effect is equally perverse: as with Bernard's methods, failure 
(as in Cuba and Nicaragua) breeds contempt, while success (as in 
Chile) turns potential friends into renegades. Meanwhile the 
institution is an international embarrassment to the nation that wields 
it. 
One might seek even more topical parallels between the events 
and institutions in The Name of the Rose and those in the 
contemporary world. But Eco has created neither a mere history 
lesson nor a sermon on contemporary international politics, but a 
system of mirrors by which the present and the past are allowed to 
reflect, distort and parody each other. 
Structure II. The Denouement of The Name of the Rose: 
Between the Modern and the Post-Modern Detective Story 
There is a peculiar tension all through The Name of the Rose 
between creation and parody, between the apparently sincere imita- 
tion of the topoi of the classic mystery novel and the carnivalization of 
its forms. This tension explodes in the denouement. It requires a 
backward glance, though, at the standard ending of the detective story 
and the way its post-modern revisionists have turned it inside out. 
In its standard manifestations the form of the detective story is 
almost entirely ritualized: a murder is committed, the detective is 
called in to investigate, clues are followed up, stories checked, 16




hypotheses presented and discarded; finally the villain is unmasked 
and the crime explained to the subsidiary characters-and to the 
reader. Or as Dennis Porter has put it: "In the process of telling one 
tale, a classic detective story uncovers another. It purports to narrate 
the course of an investigation, but the 'open' story of the investigation 
gradually unravels the `hidden' story of the crime. "" 
The ultimate desideratum of the final explanation-the 
obligatory section of the novel that turns the fragmented clues of the 
original crime into the material of narrative-is that it be both 
astonishing and predictable at once. In the "golden age" of the detec- 
tive story between the wars, when its writers belonged to guilds and 
wrote up sets of rules governing the form," the chief point of the 
regulations was fairness-allowing the reader to match wits with the 
author on terms that both parties could understand. In more modern 
terms, Roger Caillois tells us that the author of the whodunit 
"triumphs by explaining the impossible. He first presents an event as 
inadmissible, and then accounts for it easily, elegantly, without 
forcing anything or using elaborate contrivances. . . . At bottom the 
unmasking of a criminal is less important than the reduction of the 
impossible to the possible, the inexplicable to the explained, the 
supernatural to the natural."" When the explanation is over, the 
detective hands the criminal over to justice or, not infrequently, allows 
the criminal to take his own life. 
This pattern is so strongly marked that it was parodied almost as 
soon as it was established. Even before the so-called "golden age" 
between the wars, E. C. Bentley's Trent's Last Case (1913) had 
exhibited a false-bottom ending, in which the detective's explanation 
of the death of Sigsbee Manderson turns out to require several major 
revisions. In the conventional first ending Trent reveals that what at 
first had appeared to be a political gang murder was actually a sordid 
domestic crime. But then the tables are turned: after confronting the 
young man he had accused, Trent admits error and instead comes to 
the conclusion that the death was a suicide, till in the final chapter it is 
revealed to have been the result of an accident. 
All this, however, makes less difference than it might seem, for 
while Trent's Last Case was fatal to the convention (derived from Poe 
and Doyle) of the superman-detective, Bentley had less rejected the 
conventional ending than he had triplicated it. For each new ending 
confirms the essential process of detective hermeneutics, merely 
adding a few extra clues which had been previously produced within 17
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the purview of both detective and reader, but which Trent, certainly, 
had not taken into account. 
Throughout the golden age and after, practitioners of the 
whodunit worked out variation upon variation on the static topos of 
the deductive denouement. Where the case is genuinely altered is in 
the postmodern versions ofthe detective story-what I have called the 
antimystery. In the major avatars of this subgenre-including works 
like Alain Robbe-Grillet's The Erasers, Friedrich DUrrenmates The 
Pledge and Jorge Luis Borges's "Death and the Compass"-the 
expected conclusion is wrenched around, not merely to a surprising 
twist, but to a deconstruction of the form. 
Borges and Robbe-Grillet use opposing gambits. In "Death and 
the Compass," the detective carries out the deductions in the purest 
Holmesian fashion and predicts a fourth murder to complete a 
complex geographical, mystical and numerological scheme: what he 
does not foresee, fatally, is that the murder will be his own.'4 The 
Robbe-Grillet nouveau roman is longer and less lucid, involving the 
play of surfaces and distortions of time and space. But within that 
surrealistic texture the plot, reminiscent of the Oedipus, concerns a 
detective who is sent to investigate a shooting. He is misinformed that 
the assassin's target is dead; twenty-four hours later the victim is 
indeed shot dead, but it is the detective who has become his accidental 
assassin. 
Diirrenmatt's version is less slick and more pathetic. In The 
Pledge the super-detective, Inspector Matthai, though about to leave 
the country on an overseas assignment that was to have been the 
climax of his career, begins investigating a set of gruesome sex- 
murders of children. In a moment of genuine passion, he swears to the 
mother of the latest victim that he will not rest until he has brought the 
monster to justice. Obsessed with his pledge Matthai sacrifices fame 
and success to stay on the case: he sets a trap for the killer using 
another little girl as the bait. But Matthai waits and waits and the killer 
does not appear. Years pass, Matthai himself goes to seed, the little 
girl grows into a warped and unhappy adolescent. The ending 
bespeaks hideous waste of life and energy-but what has gone wrong? 
Were Matthars deductions mistaken? Not till long after both detec- 
tive and girl have in effect been destroyed by Matthars zeal is the truth 
revealed: that Matthai had been a perfect detective, had been correct 
in every detail,. but that the killer's rendezvous with justice was 
prevented by that most banal of chance events, a fatal auto accident. 18




In Robbe-Grillet, the detective's semiotic investigations lead 
him to an inadvertent murder; in Borges, to a triumph that is his own 
destruction; in Diirrenmatt, to a dead end. The denouement of The 
Name of the Rose partakes of all three topoi of the antimystery. 
First of all, William and Adso had been called in to investigate a 
case of sudden death at the nameless abbey where the story is set for 
what might be called political reasons. The Benedictine order is 
hoping to stay neutral and more or less independent of the struggles 
between Pope and Emperor, Ghibelline and Guelf, and the abbot 
fears that the disorder of an unexplained homicide will put the abbey 
into the power of the Pope's inquisition. But the effect of the investiga- 
tion is to stir up suspicions that lead to further homicides, and to the 
false and irrelevant but politically damaging arrest of two monks for 
heresy and witchcraft by the papal inquisitor. 
This is only a foreshadowing of the eventual solution of the 
crimes, which leads to the effective destruction of the abbey as a 
whole. This ending, as dramatically gripping as it is philosophically 
fascinating, involves the final confrontation of William, the apostle of 
positivism and enlightened rationality, with the blind sage Jorge of 
Burgos, who like Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor seeks to enslave his 
fellow-creatures' minds in order to rescue them from too much 
knowledge and freedom. While the Abbot himself suffocates in a 
coffin-like passage below them, the confrontation takes place in the 
finis Africae, the secret room in the monastic library where Jorge has 
hidden the Aristotelian treatise on comedy that symbolizes his terror 
of knowledge. There Jorge proudly admits that he poisoned the book's 
pages to keep its contents forever from spreading, thereby entailing 
the deaths of two monks who insisted upon reading it. But to the book- 
loving reader, the horror of this confession pales before what follows: 
in the course of the struggle and the darkling pursuit through the 
midnight library subsequent to Jorge's confession, Adso's oil lamp is 
dashed from his hands, lands on a dry pile of parchment, and "as if for 
centuries those ancient pages had been yearning for arson and were 
rejoicing in the sudden satisfaction of an immemorial thirst for 
ecpyrosis," the Aristotle manuscript and with it the entire library, the 
wonder of Europe, burns to the ground. Jorge is dead, and in a 
technical sense justice has been done, but William's is a pyrrhic 
victory in which no one could take any satisfaction. 
But the principal victim of the denouement is neither the Abbot 
nor the library itself, but the hermeneutic process of detection that 19
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underlies the novel and its entire genre. As William himself is honest 
enough to admit to Adso, amid the burning carnage of the library, he 
discovered Jorge's guilt via a train of reasoning that was in fact 
completely mistaken. While there were many clues that William read 
rightly, the trail that led him most directly to Jorge was an intertextual 
pattern-the connection that seems to be woven between the 
successive deaths in the abbey and the prophecy of the seven angels 
with the seven trumpets in the book of Revelation (8:6 to 10:10). 
The first death, that of Adelmo the illustrator, who is found fallen 
from a high window into a bloody patch of snow, resembles the first 
angel whose trumpet brings "hail and fire mingled with blood" 
(p. 159). The next day Venantius is found drowned in a tub of blood, 
recalling the prophecy of the second angel, at the sound of whose 
trumpet "the third part of the sea became blood." And similarly 
through the three mysterious deaths that follow: the third angel 
poisons "a third of the rivers" and Berengar is found poisoned in the 
balneary; with the fourth trumpet "a third of the sun was struck and a 
third of the moon, and a third of the stars" and Severinus is found with 
his head bashed in by an armillary sphere portraying the sun, moon 
and stars; the fifth trumpet brings locusts with "power like the power 
of scorpions of the earth," and on the fifth day Malachi falls dying of 
poison, with the mysterious last words "he told me . . . truly . . . it had 
the power of a thousand scorpions. . ." 
Eco's use of the seven angels of the apocalypse is itself 
intertextual. This literary pattern recalls many classic detective 
stories: including S. S. Van Dine's The Benson Murder Case, where 
a series of murders is based on nursery rhymes; Agatha Christie's The 
ABC Murders, with an alphabetical pattern; Ellery Queen's Ten 
Days Wonder, where the crimes follow the Ten Commandments. In 
classic mysteries, the pattern is a red herring: it is a way of concealing 
another, more significant pattern. This is what Borges parodies in 
"Death and the Compass," where Lonnrot the detective sees through 
a specious numerological pattern of threes to a genuine pattern of 
fours-and so keeps the appointment in Samarrah with his own 
murderer. 
In The Name of the Rose, it is the connection of the deaths with 
the book of Apocalypse and with Jorge's violently apocalyptic 
sermon that leads William to link the Spanish monk and the murders. 
To a reader familiar with the topoi of detection, it seems quite 
reasonable: Jorge is, as a blind man, the "least likely person" to have 20




committed the crimes, and therefore, by the conventions of mystery, 
an excellent candidate. Furthermore, Jorge is one of very few monks 
with the temperament to have committed a ruthless series of crimes, 
and the only one made on sufficiently grand an intellectual scale to be 
a worthy foe to William-no one else could play Moriarty to his 
Holmes. 
The penultimate revelation, of course, is that William's 
reasoning is based on paralogism. If the murders are a connected and 
concerted plot, then Jorge must be behind it. But as William admits to 
an astonished Adso, "There was no plot . . . and I discovered it by 
mistake" (p. 491). Jorge poisoned the Poetics of Comedy, right 
enough, but the apparent connections among the deaths-and of the 
deaths to the prophecy-were meaningless coincidences: 
"I arrived at Jorge through an apocalyptic pattern that seemed to 
underlie all the crimes, and yet it was accidental. I arrived at 
Jorge seeking one criminal for all the crimes and we discovered 
that each crime was committed by a different person, or by no 
one. I arrived at Jorge pursuing the plan of a perverse and rational 
mind, and there was no plan, or rather Jorge himself was 
overcome by his own initial design and there began a sequence of 
causes, and concauses, and of causes contradicting one another, 
which proceeded on their own, creating relations that did not 
stem from any plan. Where is all my wisdom, then? I behaved 
stubbornly, pursuing a semblance of order, when I should have 
known well that there is no order in the universe." (p. 492) 
Like Matthai in The Pledge, William has been cheated by chance, and 
though evil is not finally triumphant, the semiotic rationale of literary 
detection is decisively defeated. 
What I hesitatingly would call the ultimate revelation is 
something that occurred to me after I had completed the novel-and 
while one perhaps might grasp it as it happens it is not marked or noted 
within the text. I am referring to the fact that the phony apocalyptic 
pattern William follows on the trail of Jorge continues unbroken right 
to the end. The sixth victim, the abbot, suffocates, as we said, in a 
sealed passageway-recalling the prophecy of the sixth angel and 
death by suffocation, the monstrous horsemen who kill by "smoke 
and sulphur" which "issue from their mouths." And the last death is 
appropriately that of Jorge himself, who succeeds in killing himself 
and foiling William's desire to read the lost manuscript by cramming 21
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the poisoned pages down his own throat. This recalls the last angel of 
Revelation, who gives John a scroll and tells him "Take it and eat. . . . 
And I . . . ate it; it was sweet as honey in my mouth, but when I had 
eaten it my stomach was made bitter." 
In a playful way, then, Eco rejects the semiotic faith that one may 
accurately read the world through patterns, but continues 
nevertheless to impose upon the story the patterns we are warned 
against trusting. Has Eco rejected the play of signs or affirmed it? Is 
this an anti-mystery-or an anti-anti-mystery? If I am correct, in the 
ending of this astonishing novel the careful reader is set uneasily adrift 
between the radical rationalism of the detective story and the radical 
deconstruction of that rationalism. And the purpose of the 
reverberation between these ways of reading might be to make us 
conscious of the special kind of text this is and the way we must 
decode it. 
Here as elsewhere in The Name of the Rose one may detect an 
enactment of Eco's earlier criticism, in this case the 1975-77 essay 
"Lector in Fabula," first printed in The Role of the Reader. After an 
analysis of the contradictory sign-structures and demands made on 
the reader's inferential capacity within "Drame" (a metafiction by 
Alphonse Allais), Eco concluded that 
there are different types of fictional texts. Some ask for a 
maximum of intrusion . . . and are called "open" works. Some 
others are mealymouthed and, while pretending to elicit our 
cooperation, in fact want us to think their way and are very 
"closed" and repressive. "Drame" seems to stay half-way: it 
lures the Model Reader into an excess of cooperation and then 
punishes him for having overdone it. 15 
Now what I have here called mystery and anti-mystery are, in effect, 
what Eco has called "closed" and "open" texts. The Name of the 
Rose is neither; like "Drame," it "is neither open nor closed: it 
belongs to a third category of works, to an exclusive club whose 
chairman is probably Tristram Shandy. These works tell stories 
about the way stories are built up . . ." (p. 256). Like "Drame," The 
Name of the Rose "asks us . . . to extrapolate from it the rules of the 
textual discipline it suggests" (p. 256). Learning these rules has 
always been what Eco's work has been about. 22
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